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Rikki	  Reyna	  
Riot-­‐	  The	  End	  of	  Violent	  Protests	  in	  New	  York	  -­‐Final	  Draft	  
	  
It	  had	  been	  a	  quiet	  summer.	  But	  then	  on	  a	  Thursday	  afternoon	  in	  mid	  July	  the	  
story	  broke.	  Cops	  had	  arrested	  a	  man	  on	  Staten	  Island	  for	  selling	  loose	  cigarettes—
an	  offense	  he	  had	  been	  arrested	  for	  multiple	  times	  before.	  But	  this	  time	  he	  resisted.	  
In	  fact,	  he	  told	  cops,	  “It	  stops	  today.”	  Officers	  wrestled	  the	  400-­‐pound	  man	  to	  the	  
ground,	  with	  one	  cop	  putting	  him	  in	  a	  chokehold,	  a	  move	  that	  had	  been	  banned	  by	  
the	  NYPD	  in	  1993.	  The	  man	  was	  asthmatic.	  He	  told	  cops,	  “I	  can’t	  breathe,	  I	  can’t	  
breathe.”	  His	  body	  appeared	  to	  convulse.	  Then	  he	  lay	  on	  the	  ground,	  motionless.	  The	  
cop,	  Daniel	  Pantaleo,	  was	  White.	  The	  victim,	  Eric	  Garner,	  was	  Black.	  The	  incident	  
had	  occurred	  in	  the	  confines	  of	  120th	  precinct	  in	  Staten	  Island.	  And	  video	  of	  the	  
confrontation	  was	  captured	  on	  a	  phone	  by	  a	  bystander,	  Ramsey	  Orta.	  The	  New	  York	  
Daily	  News	  published	  Orta’s	  cell	  phone	  video	  online.	  The	  story	  was	  followed	  by	  
every	  news	  organization	  in	  the	  city.	  New	  Yorkers	  took	  to	  the	  streets.	  They	  held	  
protests	  for	  weeks.	  	  
	  
	   In	  New	  York	  City,	  following	  Garner’s	  case,	  protests	  and	  rallies	  were	  sustained	  
for	  months	  and	  reached	  new	  heights	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Grand	  Jury’s	  decision	  to	  
not	  indict	  the	  cop,	  Daniel	  Pantaleo,	  for	  his	  actions	  that	  day.	  Protesters	  marched	  and	  
held	  “die-­‐ins”	  throughout	  the	  city,	  halting	  traffic	  and	  disrupting	  public	  places	  to	  get	  
their	  message	  heard.	  For	  the	  most	  part	  it	  was	  peaceful.	  But	  what	  happened	  to	  Eric	  
Garner	  would	  have	  incited	  a	  very	  different	  response	  in	  New	  York	  City	  in	  a	  different	  
time.	  There	  was	  a	  time	  when	  New	  Yorkers	  wouldn’t	  just	  protest.	  They	  would	  riot.	  	  
	  
Those	  riots	  seem	  incapable	  of	  happening	  in	  today’s	  New	  York.	  
	  
Why	  riots	  have	  not	  swept	  through	  the	  streets	  of	  New	  York	  since	  the	  late	  
1960s	  is	  a	  question	  with	  many	  interwoven	  answers.	  Historian	  Michael	  B.	  Katz	  of	  the	  
University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  tried	  to	  answer	  that	  question	  more	  broadly	  in	  his	  2012	  
book	  called	  “Why	  Don’t	  American	  Cities	  Burn?”	  He	  writes,	  “Civil	  violence—	  burning,	  
looting,	  sniping	  at	  police—actions	  aimed	  largely	  at	  symbols	  and	  agents	  of	  exclusion	  
and	  exploitation,	  remain	  part	  of	  urban	  history,	  not	  live	  possibilities	  in	  the	  urban	  
present.”	  Katz	  began	  to	  question	  the	  lack	  of	  rioting	  in	  the	  U.S.—or	  what	  he	  prefers	  to	  
call	  ‘civil	  violence’—after	  serving	  as	  a	  jury	  foreman	  on	  a	  case	  in	  Philadelphia	  where	  
one	  middle-­‐aged	  Black	  man	  killed	  another	  in	  the	  street	  over	  an	  argument	  about	  five	  
dollars.	  Katz	  was	  perplexed	  as	  to	  how	  this	  and	  so	  many	  other	  acts	  of	  criminal	  
violence	  could	  happen	  in	  a	  neighborhood	  whose	  residents,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  could	  
instead	  collectively	  act	  together	  to	  challenge	  forces	  of	  oppression	  that	  made	  five	  
dollars	  something	  worth	  fighting	  over.	  	  
	   	  
What	  Katz	  found	  was	  that	  three	  main	  factors—what	  he	  termed	  as	  “the	  
ecology	  of	  power,	  the	  management	  of	  marginalization,	  and	  the	  incorporation	  and	  
control	  of	  immigrants”	  resulted	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  civil	  violence	  in	  American	  cities	  in	  
the	  post-­‐civil-­‐rights	  era	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  	  
	  
	   The	  ecology	  of	  power,	  as	  Katz	  states,	  changed	  in	  cities	  after	  the	  1970s	  when	  
the	  Great	  Migration—when	  millions	  of	  southern	  Blacks	  moved	  to	  northern	  cities	  
during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century—was	  completed.	  Katz	  writes,	  
“Boundary	  challenges	  receded,	  the	  ecology	  of	  urban	  power	  was	  rearranged.	  Whites	  
left	  central	  cities	  for	  suburbs	  where	  they	  found	  ways	  to	  erect	  new	  and	  effective	  
borders,	  and	  many	  cities	  became	  majority	  or	  near-­‐majority	  minority.”	  The	  boundary	  
challenges	  Katz	  refers	  to,	  occurred	  during	  the	  1950s	  to	  1970s	  when	  Blacks	  were	  
moving	  to	  areas	  of	  cities	  like	  Harlem	  that	  were	  once	  dominated	  by	  a	  White—albeit	  
poor,	  immigrant	  White—population.	  He	  notes	  that	  against	  this	  history,	  the	  riots	  in	  
Los	  Angeles	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  stand	  out	  because	  they	  once	  again	  showed	  what	  can	  
happen	  when	  tensions	  between	  races	  occupying	  the	  same	  space—between	  Blacks	  
and	  Asians	  in	  that	  case—erupt	  in	  civil	  violence.	  
	  
	   Katz	  writes	  that	  in	  other	  American	  cities,	  like	  New	  York,	  the	  majority-­‐
minority	  flexed	  its	  muscle	  with	  certain	  political	  victories—mainly	  the	  election	  of	  
minority	  Mayors	  in	  dozens	  of	  large	  cities	  across	  the	  U.S.	  from	  the	  1960s	  through	  the	  
1990s.	  In	  1990	  the	  first	  Black	  Mayor	  of	  New	  York	  City,	  David	  Dinkins,	  was	  elected.	  
But	  ironically,	  riots	  in	  Brooklyn	  are	  often	  cited	  as	  a	  main	  reason	  contributing	  to	  his	  
loss	  of	  reelection.	  
	  
Political	  power	  also	  increased	  as	  police	  departments	  in	  American	  cities	  
began	  to	  hire	  minority	  Police	  Chiefs,	  Katz	  states—although	  not	  in	  New	  York—after	  
the	  1960s.	  The	  New	  York	  Police	  Department,	  however,	  as	  in	  many	  other	  cities,	  did	  
begin	  to	  hire	  minorities	  onto	  the	  force	  in	  larger	  numbers.	  Together,	  the	  power	  of	  the	  
vote	  and	  increased	  representation	  in	  important	  civic	  departments	  gave	  Blacks	  and	  
other	  minorities	  less	  reason	  to	  vent	  their	  grievances	  in	  other,	  nonconformist	  ways.	  
Katz	  writes,	  “Limited	  though	  it	  is,	  African	  American	  urban	  political	  power	  exceeds	  
that	  available	  to	  residents	  of	  Third	  World	  shantytowns	  or	  Parisian	  banlieus.”	  	  
	  
	   Although	  Blacks	  and	  other	  minorities	  might	  have	  gained	  some	  political	  
power	  after	  the	  1960s	  in	  New	  York	  and	  other	  American	  cities,	  they	  were	  not,	  by	  any	  
means,	  no	  longer	  marginalized.	  But	  their	  marginalized	  position	  was	  “managed,”	  Katz	  
writes,	  through	  effective	  “selective	  incorporation,	  mimetic	  reform,	  indirect	  rule,	  
consumption,	  and	  repression	  and	  surveillance.	  Together,	  they	  set	  in	  motion	  a	  
process	  of	  depoliticization	  that	  undercuts	  the	  capacity	  for	  collective	  action,”	  Katz	  
writes.	  	  	  
	  
	   The	  “selective	  incorporation”	  Katz	  refers	  to	  most	  notably	  includes	  the	  
increased	  participation	  of	  Blacks	  and	  other	  minorities	  in	  public	  sector	  jobs.	  Even	  
though	  many	  cities	  experienced	  financial	  hardships	  in	  the	  post-­‐civil-­‐rights-­‐era—
certainly	  New	  York	  did	  with	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  the	  1970s—at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  
percent	  of	  minorities	  working	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  increased,	  in	  part,	  by	  
government-­‐sponsored	  or	  supported	  initiatives	  like	  affirmative	  action.	  Katz	  writes,	  
“Nonetheless,	  these	  limited	  ladders	  of	  mobility	  proved	  crucial,	  fracturing	  African	  
American	  communities	  along	  lines	  of	  class	  and	  gender	  (women	  fared	  far	  better	  than	  
men)	  and	  eroding	  the	  potential	  for	  collective	  protest	  by	  holding	  out	  the	  promise	  of	  
economic	  and	  occupational	  achievement	  and	  spreading	  a	  modest	  prosperity	  more	  
widely	  than	  ever	  before.”	  	   	  
	  
	   In	  a	  similar	  vain,	  “mimetic	  reform,”	  reform	  that	  was	  purely	  representational	  
and	  superficial,	  manipulated	  public	  institutions	  to	  manage	  civil	  unrest	  in	  local	  
communities.	  Using	  an	  example	  from	  historian	  Ira	  Katznelson’s	  portrayal	  of	  Mayor	  
John	  Lindsay’s	  administration’s	  handling	  of	  public	  dissent	  over	  government	  control	  
of	  city	  schools,	  Katz	  characterized	  Mayor	  Lindsay’s	  creation	  of	  the	  Neighborhood	  
Action	  Program	  and	  the	  District	  School	  Board	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  as	  examples	  of	  
“mimetic	  reform.”	  These	  kinds	  of	  reforms	  were,	  “measures	  that	  respond	  to	  
insurgent	  demands	  without	  devolving	  real	  power	  or	  redistributing	  significant	  re-­‐
sources”	  Katz	  writes.	  
	  
	   The	  control	  over	  the	  majority-­‐minority	  was	  not	  just	  handled	  by	  the	  public	  
sector,	  but	  the	  private	  sector	  as	  well,	  Katz	  writes,	  through	  increased	  and	  widespread	  
consumer	  culture.	  America’s	  obsession	  with	  consumerism	  exploded	  in	  the	  1950s	  
with	  the	  conspicuous	  consumption	  that	  was	  a	  result	  and	  response	  to	  the	  austerity	  of	  
the	  war	  years.	  But	  that	  story	  is	  more	  the	  story	  of	  White	  suburban	  Americans.	  Katz	  
writes,	  “In	  the	  1960s,	  corporate	  America	  discovered	  the	  newly	  urbanized	  black	  
consumer.”	  He	  states	  that	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  Blacks	  were	  spending	  
nearly	  as	  much	  on	  non-­‐durable	  goods	  as	  were	  their	  White	  counterparts.	  “The	  result	  
was	  the	  blossoming	  of	  consumer	  debt	  and	  bankruptcy—	  which	  reached	  previously	  
unimagined	  heights—	  rather	  than	  mobilization	  expressed	  through	  politics	  or	  
collective	  violence,”	  Katz	  writes.	  
	  
	   It’s	  hard	  to	  quantify	  how	  the	  role	  of	  consumerism	  on	  a	  national	  level	  affected	  
diminished	  counterculture	  and	  “civil	  violence”	  locally.	  But	  one	  national	  trend	  with	  
local	  consequences	  was	  increased	  policing.	  Katz	  found	  that	  local	  governments	  
increased	  defense	  spending	  in	  the	  post-­‐civil-­‐rights	  era.	  He	  writes,	  “Like	  the	  federal	  
government,	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  1960s	  civil	  violence,	  they	  also	  ramped	  up	  
spending.	  Local	  spending	  on	  police	  protection	  leapt	  from	  $	  2,001	  million	  in	  1965	  to	  
$	  3,803	  million	  in	  1970	  and	  $	  6,813	  million	  in	  1975.	  By	  1995,	  it	  had	  reached	  $58,768	  
million.”	  New	  York	  City’s	  response	  to	  increased	  violence	  and	  crime	  also	  included	  a	  
change	  in	  police	  tactics	  beginning	  with	  the	  now	  famously	  known	  “broken	  windows”	  
policing,	  or	  more	  euphemistically,	  “quality	  of	  life	  enforcement”—the	  idea	  that	  
policing	  minor	  crimes	  and	  violations	  will	  prevent	  further,	  more	  serious	  crimes	  from	  
occurring.	  This	  kind	  of	  repression,	  Katz	  argues,	  is	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  people	  who	  feel	  
targeted	  by	  this	  kind	  of	  policing	  would	  not	  participate	  in	  civil	  violence	  against	  those	  
in	  power.	  He	  writes,	  “many	  black	  men,	  evading	  warrants	  or	  just	  fearful	  of	  potential	  
arrest,	  avoid	  the	  institutions	  and	  agents	  of	  the	  state,	  thereby	  eliminating	  themselves	  
from	  participation	  in	  political	  action.”	  	  	  
	  
Repression	  and	  control	  by	  way	  of	  police,	  government,	  and	  also	  the	  private	  
sector,	  has	  devolved	  neighborhoods	  and	  communities	  whose	  residents	  once	  
expressed	  themselves	  through	  “civil	  violence”	  into	  places	  where	  “criminal	  violence”	  
is	  now	  the	  norm,	  Katz	  contends.	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  case	  he	  deliberated	  on	  as	  a	  juror	  
in	  a	  Philadelphia	  courthouse,	  he	  writes,	  “The	  fatal	  encounter	  between	  Herbert	  
Manes	  and	  Shorty—	  two	  black	  men	  in	  a	  bleak,	  impoverished	  urban	  neighborhood—	  
has	  become	  the	  archetype	  of	  violence	  in	  America’s	  cities,	  not	  collective	  violence	  
against	  perceived	  injustice	  or	  organized	  political	  protest.”	  
	  
It’s	  difficult	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  environment	  for	  collective	  violence,	  civil	  
violence,	  or	  riots,	  what	  term	  you	  choose	  to	  use,	  has	  dissipated	  so	  drastically	  in	  New	  
York	  because	  it	  is	  an	  action	  that	  has	  a	  deep	  history	  in	  the	  city.	  Riots	  began	  in	  
developing	  neighborhoods	  of	  New	  York	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  
Harlem	  race	  riots	  in	  1935	  were	  the	  first	  of	  its	  kind.	  New	  York	  had	  certainly	  seen	  
race	  riots	  before.	  Going	  back	  centuries	  earlier,	  there	  was	  the	  slave	  revolt	  of	  1712	  
and	  the	  draft	  riots	  of	  1863.	  But	  the	  Harlem	  race	  riots	  of	  1935	  was	  the	  first	  time	  
where	  the	  Black	  community	  in	  New	  York	  responded	  with	  force	  to	  what	  they	  
believed	  was	  the	  killing	  of	  a	  person	  of	  color	  in	  their	  community	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  
white	  perpetrator.	  	  	  
	  
On	  March	  19,	  1935,	  a	  16-­‐year-­‐old	  black	  Puerto	  Rican	  teenager	  named	  Lino	  
Rivera	  was	  caught	  shoplifting	  a	  penknife	  from	  an	  S.H.	  Kress	  store	  on	  Harlem’s	  125th	  
Street.	  Rivera	  and	  the	  shop	  owner	  had	  an	  altercation	  and	  the	  shop	  owner	  called	  the	  
police.	  But	  when	  the	  police	  arrived	  the	  shop	  owner	  asked	  that	  the	  young	  Rivera	  not	  
be	  arrested.	  A	  crowd	  had	  gathered	  on	  the	  sidewalk	  outside	  his	  store	  and	  they	  were	  
growing	  restless	  as	  rumors	  that	  the	  boy	  had	  been	  beaten	  began	  to	  make	  rounds.	  The	  
police	  obliged	  and	  let	  Rivera	  go.	  Rivera	  exited	  out	  a	  back	  door,	  out	  of	  sight	  to	  the	  
crowd.	  The	  rumors	  continued	  to	  fly—and	  now	  the	  crowd	  unknowingly	  believed	  
Rivera	  had	  been	  killed.	  	  
	  
As	  afternoon	  turned	  to	  evening	  the	  crowd	  began	  to	  grow	  and	  became	  more	  
organized.	  Picketers	  arrived	  and	  leaflets,	  many	  written	  with	  incorrect	  information,	  
began	  to	  be	  distributed.	  One	  demonstrator	  then	  threw	  a	  rock	  into	  the	  glass	  window	  
of	  the	  shop	  sparking	  the	  fuse	  that	  erupted	  in	  two	  days	  of	  looting	  of	  white-­‐owned	  
shops	  throughout	  Harlem.	  	  
	  
Peace	  wasn’t	  restored	  to	  the	  neighborhood	  until	  late	  in	  the	  second	  day	  of	  
rioting.	  More	  than	  100	  Black	  people	  had	  been	  arrested,	  another	  100	  injured	  and	  3	  
killed.	  	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  riots,	  and	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  Black	  leaders,	  the	  Mayor	  of	  New	  
York	  City	  at	  that	  time,	  the	  formidable	  Fiorello	  LaGuardia,	  assigned	  a	  commission	  to	  
study	  the	  socioeconomic	  conditions	  of	  the	  people	  in	  Harlem,	  but	  the	  commission’s	  
resulting	  report	  did	  little	  to	  exact	  reforms.	  Like	  most	  social	  reports	  that	  came	  before	  
or	  after,	  it	  was	  no	  “How	  the	  Other	  Half	  Lives”	  by	  Jacob	  Riis.	  There	  was	  no	  change.	  All	  
of	  the	  segregation,	  discrimination	  and	  inequality	  that	  festered	  in	  the	  Black	  
communities	  in	  New	  York	  in	  the	  1930s	  continued	  to	  brew.	  With	  no	  systematic	  
change	  to	  the	  underlying	  social	  structures,	  a	  riot	  was	  due	  to	  erupt	  again.	  And	  it	  did,	  
less	  than	  a	  decade	  later,	  in	  1943.	  
	  
On	  August	  1st	  of	  that	  year,	  a	  Black	  American	  soldier	  was	  shot	  by	  a	  White	  
police	  officer	  in	  Harlem.	  The	  soldier	  interfered	  when	  the	  police	  officer	  attempted	  to	  
arrest	  a	  Black	  woman	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  for	  disorderly	  conduct.	  The	  soldier	  was	  
wounded,	  but	  as	  had	  been	  the	  case	  eight	  years	  earlier	  with	  Lino	  Rivera,	  the	  rumor	  in	  
the	  neighborhood	  was	  that	  the	  Black	  soldier	  had	  been	  killed.	  Harlem	  exploded	  
again.	  	  	  
For	  two	  days	  stores	  were	  looted	  and	  Black	  rioters	  clashed	  with	  the	  city’s	  
White	  police	  force.	  Order	  was	  restored	  when	  Mayor	  LaGuardia	  called	  in	  8,000	  
soldiers	  of	  the	  New	  York	  State	  Guard	  and	  enforced	  a	  10:30	  p.m.	  curfew	  on	  Harlem	  
residents.	  He	  also	  banned	  liquor	  sales	  in	  the	  neighborhood.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  end	  500	  people	  were	  arrested,	  100	  of	  them	  were	  women,	  500	  people	  
were	  injured	  and	  five	  people	  were	  killed	  in	  the	  Harlem	  riots	  of	  1943.	  There	  was	  an	  
estimated	  cost	  of	  five	  million	  dollars	  in	  damages.	  	  
	  
LaGuardia	  had	  been	  quick	  to	  state	  that	  the	  events	  on	  those	  two	  summer	  
nights	  in	  Harlem	  were	  not	  race	  riots.	  The	  mayor	  and	  his	  administration	  wanted	  to	  
distance	  the	  riots	  in	  Harlem	  from	  the	  race	  riots	  that	  happened	  in	  Detroit	  just	  two	  
months	  prior.	  His	  police	  commissioner,	  Lewis	  J.	  Valentine,	  went	  even	  further	  and	  
stated	  that	  gangs	  of	  “hoodlums”	  from	  Southern	  cities	  had	  been	  sent	  to	  New	  York	  to	  
“cause	  trouble.”	  Valentine’s	  far-­‐fetched	  explanation	  was	  reported	  in	  the	  New	  York	  
Times,	  but	  the	  publication	  also	  took	  the	  administration	  to	  task	  for	  not	  acting	  on	  the	  
commission’s	  report	  that	  had	  been	  done	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Harlem	  riots	  of	  1935.	  In	  
fact,	  the	  Times	  noted,	  much	  of	  the	  report	  had	  not	  even	  been	  published.	  	  
	  
The	  Harlem	  race	  riots	  of	  1943	  proved	  as	  ineffective	  as	  those	  in	  1935	  in	  
making	  issues	  of	  equality	  a	  concern	  to	  those	  in	  power.	  As	  New	  York	  City	  spiraled	  
downward	  into	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  crisis	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  Black	  
communities	  in	  Harlem,	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  Bedford-­‐Stuyvesant,	  Brooklyn,	  continued	  
to	  disproportionately	  bear	  the	  brunt	  of	  New	  York’s	  socioeconomic	  collapse.	  New	  
York’s	  fiscal	  crisis,	  which	  contributed	  to	  fewer	  city	  services	  and	  escalating	  crime	  
rates,	  and	  the	  larger	  context	  of	  a	  national	  civil	  rights	  movement,	  all	  contributed	  to	  
the	  race	  riots	  that	  would	  heat	  up,	  lower	  to	  a	  simmer,	  then	  rise	  and	  boil	  over	  time	  
and	  again	  in	  the	  decades	  to	  come.	  
	  
It	  was	  nearly	  20	  years	  before	  the	  next	  race	  riot	  took	  the	  streets	  of	  Harlem.	  On	  
July	  18,	  1964	  a	  15-­‐year-­‐old	  black	  teenager	  named	  James	  Powell	  had	  been	  shot	  and	  
killed	  by	  a	  White	  NYPD	  Lieutenant	  named	  Thomas	  Gilligan	  on	  Manhattan’s	  Upper	  
East	  Side.	  Gilligan	  was	  off-­‐duty	  but	  was	  near	  the	  scene	  when	  Powell	  had	  reportedly	  
followed	  a	  superintendent	  named	  James	  Lynch	  into	  one	  of	  his	  local	  buildings.	  Lynch	  
had	  sprayed	  a	  group	  of	  young	  Black	  boys	  with	  a	  water	  hose	  because	  they	  were	  
loitering	  in	  front	  of	  his	  buildings.	  There	  were	  conflicting	  reports,	  but	  Powell	  and	  
Gilligan	  had	  an	  altercation	  at	  the	  building	  and	  Powell	  reportedly	  cut	  Gilligan	  on	  his	  
arm	  with	  a	  knife.	  Then	  Gilligan	  shot	  Powell	  dead.	  	  
	  
	   Two	  days	  after	  Powell’s	  death,	  riots	  ensued	  in	  Harlem	  again.	  But	  this	  time	  
riots	  also	  erupted	  in	  Brooklyn’s	  Bedford-­‐Stuyvesant.	  The	  riots	  continued	  for	  five	  
days.	  More	  than	  100	  were	  injured,	  hundreds	  more	  arrested,	  and	  one	  death	  was	  
reported.	  But	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  poignantly	  noted	  that	  these	  riots	  had	  grown	  out	  
of	  a	  peaceful	  rally	  near	  125th	  street	  and	  7th	  avenue.	  	  
	  
“There	  was	  impatience	  with	  the	  heat,	  and	  anger	  over	  the	  shooting	  of	  a	  15-­‐year-­‐
old	  Negro	  boy	  by	  an	  off-­‐duty	  white	  police	  lieutenant	  in	  Yorkville	  two	  days	  before.	  But	  
the	  crowd	  was	  not	  unruly,	  nor	  was	  there	  any	  air	  of	  violence,”	  wrote	  Paul	  L.	  
Montgomery	  of	  the	  Times.	  
	  
	   Within	  hours	  the	  night	  had	  changed.	  “The	  first	  shots	  were	  fired	  at	  10:30,	  at	  
125th	  Street	  and	  Lenox	  Avenue.	  A	  youth	  hurled	  a	  bottle	  of	  flaming	  gasoline	  at	  a	  Squad	  
car,	  and	  a	  sheet	  of	  flame	  spread	  on	  the	  street.	  A	  patrolman	  was	  burned,	  and	  his	  four	  
companions	  emptied	  their	  revolvers	  into	  the	  night	  air,”	  Montgomery	  witnessed.	  	  
	  
	   The	  visual	  of	  a	  youth	  rioter	  launching	  a	  molotav	  cocktail	  at	  police	  is	  hard	  to	  
imagine	  in	  today’s	  New	  York.	  The	  fire	  bombs	  were	  used	  in	  the	  Ferguson	  protests.	  
But	  in	  a	  city	  that	  has	  devolved	  into	  arresting	  youths	  for	  littering	  their	  metro	  cards,	  
one	  might	  ask,	  what	  would	  that	  kind	  of	  city’s	  police	  force	  do	  to	  punish	  a	  flame	  
thrower?	  
	  
	   Racial	  tensions	  continued	  to	  plague	  the	  city	  and	  beginning	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  
the	  events	  that	  exposed	  racial	  divides	  occurred	  more	  frequently.	  The	  incident	  at	  
Howard	  Beach	  in	  1986	  in	  which	  a	  Black	  man	  was	  beaten	  to	  death	  in	  an	  assault	  by	  a	  
group	  of	  White	  men	  in	  Queens,	  was	  followed	  three	  years	  later	  by	  the	  killing	  of	  a	  16-­‐
year-­‐old	  Black	  teen	  named	  Yusuf	  Hawkins	  who	  was	  shot	  by	  a	  white	  teen	  in	  
Bensonhurst,	  Brooklyn.	  In	  two	  years	  more	  time,	  the	  Crown	  Heights	  section	  of	  
Brooklyn	  erupted	  in	  riots	  after	  an	  accident	  where	  a	  Jewish	  driver	  struck	  and	  killed	  a	  
Black	  child	  with	  his	  car.	  Emergency	  responders	  at	  the	  scene	  had	  ignored	  the	  
critically	  injured	  Black	  child	  and	  instead	  attended	  to	  the	  Jewish	  driver.	  	  
	  
	   But	  something	  had	  also	  shifted	  in	  that	  time—something	  had	  changed	  in	  the	  
way	  that	  New	  Yorkers	  reacted	  not	  just	  to	  racial	  divides,	  but	  to	  racial	  tensions	  in	  
relation	  to	  police-­‐community	  interactions.	  While	  incidences	  of	  perceived	  police	  
brutality	  had	  caused	  major	  riots	  in	  1935,	  1943	  and	  1964,	  similar	  incidences	  drew	  
far	  less	  violent	  demonstrations	  in	  the	  1990s	  till	  now.	  It	  wasn’t	  that	  there	  were	  less	  
incidences	  of	  unarmed	  young	  Black	  men	  being	  shot	  and	  killed	  by	  white	  police	  
officers.	  From	  1999	  to	  2012	  there	  were	  three	  such	  cases	  in	  New	  York	  City	  that	  
garnered	  major	  media	  attention.	  Amadou	  Diallo	  in	  1999,	  Sean	  Bell	  in	  2006,	  and	  
Ramarley	  Graham	  in	  2012.	  In	  the	  rallies	  for	  Eric	  Garner	  these	  names	  of	  past	  cases	  
had	  been	  invoked	  time	  and	  again	  by	  activists.	  But	  these	  past	  cases,	  as	  had	  been	  the	  
case	  during	  the	  summer	  of	  Eric	  Garner,	  didn’t	  erupt	  in	  violence	  or	  chaos.	  They	  didn’t	  
incite	  a	  riot.	  
	  
	   Back	  last	  summer,	  within	  a	  month	  the	  protests	  that	  had	  followed	  the	  Garner	  
case	  were	  overcome	  by	  the	  news	  out	  of	  Ferguson,	  Missouri.	  In	  their	  media	  
advisories,	  activists	  in	  New	  York	  began	  to	  bill	  their	  Garner	  rallies	  as	  “solidarity	  
rallies”	  with	  the	  people	  of	  Ferguson.	  On	  an	  evening	  in	  late	  August	  a	  group	  of	  
activists	  had	  drawn	  a	  medium-­‐sized	  crowd,	  no	  more	  than	  100	  people	  down	  to	  lower	  
Manhattan	  in	  front	  of	  NYPD	  headquarters.	  	  
	  
The	  protesters	  held	  signs	  that	  read,	  "The	  police	  are	  the	  criminals,	  not	  our	  
youth,"	  and	  "Jail	  killer	  cops,"	  while	  chanting,	  "enough	  is	  enough,"	  and	  "no	  justice,	  no	  
peace,	  no	  racist	  police.”	  
	  
The	  group	  blocked	  traffic	  as	  they	  marched	  from	  NYPD	  headquarters	  to	  the	  
gates	  of	  City	  Hall	  with	  a	  police	  escort.	  On	  their	  march	  to	  City	  Hall	  they	  held	  their	  
hands	  in	  the	  air,	  yelling	  "hands	  up,	  don't	  shoot,"	  a	  rally	  cry	  that	  had	  grown	  out	  of	  
Ferguson.	  	  
	  
Former	  Councilmember	  Charles	  Barron,	  a	  regular	  character	  at	  the	  Garner	  
protests	  over	  the	  summer,	  spoke	  to	  the	  crowd	  in	  a	  fiery	  tone.	  "I	  want	  to	  give	  a	  
warning	  to	  Bill	  de	  Blasio,	  Mayor	  de	  Blasio,	  a	  warning	  to	  police	  commissioner	  Bratton-­‐-­‐
Ferguson	  today,	  New	  York	  tomorrow!	  When	  you	  don't	  listen	  to	  our	  peaceful	  
demonstration,	  the	  explosion	  is	  next."	  	  
	  
Barron	  defended	  the	  protesters	  in	  Ferguson,	  saying,	  "These	  young	  people	  are	  
not	  gonna	  get	  the	  credit	  they	  deserve.	  They're	  gonna	  call	  them	  thugs.	  They're	  gonna	  
call	  them	  outta	  control.	  They're	  gonna	  call	  them	  every	  name.	  But	  I	  say	  I	  thank	  god	  for	  
those	  young	  people	  that	  have	  the	  courage	  and	  the	  heart	  to	  say,	  'I	  had	  enough.'	  An	  eye	  
for	  an	  eye,	  a	  tooth	  for	  a	  tooth,	  a	  life	  for	  a	  life.	  Our	  people	  have	  had	  enough."	  
	  
The	  explosion	  Barron	  warned	  of	  never	  came.	  Even	  after	  the	  Grand	  Jury	  failed	  
to	  indict	  Officer	  Daniel	  Pantaleo	  in	  early	  December,	  the	  demonstrations	  that	  
followed	  for	  weeks	  in	  New	  York	  remained	  peaceful.	  	  
	  
	   Activists	  used	  social	  media	  to	  organize	  mass	  “die-­‐ins”	  in	  public	  places	  
throughout	  the	  city.	  On	  a	  Sunday	  evening	  in	  early	  December,	  hundreds	  of	  protesters	  
gathered	  in	  Union	  Square	  and	  then	  marched	  north	  up	  Park	  Avenue	  to	  Grand	  Central	  
terminal.	  A	  motorcade	  of	  cops	  escorted	  the	  protesters	  as	  the	  marched	  in	  the	  streets,	  
weaving	  through	  city	  traffic,	  and	  cops	  in	  riot	  gear	  blocked	  the	  entrance	  to	  the	  tunnel	  
at	  33rd	  Street	  and	  Park	  Avenue.	  They	  held	  signs	  that	  read,	  "Black	  lives	  matter,"	  and	  
"This	  is	  resistance."	  
	  
Once	  in	  Grand	  Central	  they	  marched	  in	  a	  circle	  around	  the	  iconic	  clock	  at	  the	  
center	  of	  the	  terminal,	  chanting,	  "Eric	  Garner,	  Michael	  Brown,	  shut	  it	  down,	  shut	  it	  
down,"	  and	  "How	  do	  spell	  racist,	  NYPD".	  They	  held	  a	  “die-­‐in”	  where	  they	  laid	  on	  the	  
floor	  for	  seven	  minutes	  in	  silence	  to	  represent	  the	  seven	  minutes	  Eric	  Garner	  laid	  on	  
the	  street	  without	  receiving	  medical	  attention.	  
	  
Then	  protesters	  exited	  Grand	  Central	  and	  marched	  to	  Herald	  Square.	  They	  
stormed	  through	  the	  front	  entrance	  of	  Macy's	  off	  Broadway	  and	  34th	  street.	  On	  the	  
first	  floor	  of	  the	  store	  they	  sat	  down	  in	  an	  aisle	  of	  the	  makeup	  department.	  A	  leader	  
of	  the	  group	  said	  to	  the	  crowd,	  "We	  won't	  break	  anything,	  but	  we	  won't	  buy	  
anything.”	  While	  they	  held	  another	  sit	  in,	  customers	  took	  pictures,	  and	  some	  
employees	  put	  up	  their	  hands	  in	  solidarity.	  
	  
From	  Herald	  Square	  they	  marched	  to	  the	  Times	  Square	  Toys	  R	  Us,	  chanting	  
"no	  justice,	  no	  Christmas."	  Protesters	  filled	  the	  bottom	  floor,	  the	  toy	  gun	  area,	  
chanting,	  "No,	  don't	  shoot."	  
	  
Down	  the	  street	  to	  the	  Times	  Square	  Disney	  Store,	  protesters	  raced	  up	  the	  
escalator	  to	  the	  second	  floor	  and	  put	  their	  sign	  that	  read	  "Black	  Lives	  Matter"	  in	  
front	  of	  Cinderella's	  White	  Castle.	  A	  leader	  of	  the	  group	  told	  the	  crowd,	  "If	  Tamar	  
Rice	  can't	  have	  a	  Christmas,	  then	  neither	  will	  we.	  And	  neither	  will	  you.	  This	  is	  how	  
the	  police	  stole	  Christmas."	  Then	  they	  sat	  down	  for	  seven	  minutes	  with	  their	  hands	  
grasped	  around	  their	  necks	  while	  lilting	  Disney	  music	  played	  in	  the	  silence.	  They	  left	  
the	  store	  chanting	  "while	  you're	  buying,	  kids	  are	  dying."	  	  
	  
During	  this	  of	  series	  “die-­‐ins”	  the	  protesters	  would	  spend	  about	  20	  minutes	  
in	  each	  store	  and	  many	  more	  that	  night.	  Customers	  continued	  to	  shop.	  The	  police	  
would	  stay	  outside	  the	  stores,	  no	  one	  told	  the	  protesters	  to	  leave.	  They	  left	  on	  their	  









	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  
